Verisign’s Path to RPKI
Verisign shares its ongoing journey toward RPKI adoption and the lessons it's learned as an operator of critical Internet infrastructure.
[Survey] Is Your Connectivity Provider Your Weakest Security Link?
To maximize the value proposition of MANRS+ to enterprises, we are asking public and private organizations to please take a short survey to evaluate the requirements for your connectivity providers.
BGP Route Leak at Angola Cables Slows Connectivity for Many Australians
On Thursday, 25 May, we saw another BGP route leak, this time causing significant delays in connectivity from Australia to sites in the US including Amazon’s AWS services and Akamai’s…
Estimating the Timeline for ASPA Deployment
When is it likely that Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) will be widely adopted as part of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)?…
South Asia, Bangladesh leading Routing Completeness
This week, the 39th South Asian Network Operators Group conference, SANOG 39, is happening in Dhaka, Bangladesh. With around one-quarter of the world’s population living…
There is Still Hope for BGP Route Leak Prevention
RFC9234 documents an active route-leak prevention approach that defines new BGP capacities exchanged during the eBGP session open time.
The United States Government Can Take Lead in RPKI Deployment
According to MANRS Observatory data, among networks run by the US Federal Government, only 0.5% of prefixes could be validated using RPKI in December 2022. Most prefixes from US Federal…
Why is Source Address Validation Still a Problem?
Currently, there is no way for customers or observers to know if a network operator deploys SAV.
SAVNET WG Seeks to Improve Existing SAV Mechanisms in Intra-Domain and Inter-Domain Networks
The Source Address Validation in Intra-domain and Inter-domain Networks Working Group has been recently formed to discuss and summarize the problems of existing source address validation mechanisms and propose requirements…