SAVNET WG Seeks to Improve Existing SAV Mechanisms in Intra-Domain and Inter-Domain Networks
The Source Address Validation in Intra-domain and Inter-domain Networks Working Group has been recently formed to discuss and summarize the problems of existing source address validation mechanisms and propose requirements…
MANRS Compliance Increasing, More Work Needed in India
Majority of MANRS networks are conformant to best practices but more needed to be done to expand its presence in developing countries.
Tracking time delays in the RPKI-based Route Origin Validation supply chain
Study shows how long it takes for a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) to propagate, and how quickly it affects Internet routing and reachability?…
Unpacking the First Route Leak Prevented by ASPA
On 25 January, a fascinating email arrived in my inbox via the Secure Inter-Domain Routing Operations (SIDROPS) mailing list with the subject line “first route leak…
RPKI Deployment Case Study: NYSERNet
Anything we can do to make the network more stable and robust is worth looking at, and the effort to implement RPKI is small in comparison to the benefits of…
The Benefits of RPKI Signed Checklists
An RSC is a new type of RPKI-signed object that permits a resource holder to sign arbitrary files or documents with a set of Internet resources.
Preventing and Detecting BGP Route Leaks With the Help of RFC 9234
BGP Role is a new configuration parameter in the BGP OPEN message to prevent and detect BGP route leaks caused by misconfigurations.
85% of MANRS Members Conformant to Actions 1 and 4
Study provides the first independent look at MANRS membership growth, conformance and RPKI ROA registration status.
Will 2023 be the Year Half of the Internet is RPKI-Enabled?
While the Internet may not be growing as quickly as it once was, the threat to the whole routing fabric is.