Action 1: Prevent propagation of incorrect routing information
This action involves ingress filtering of prefixes received from all non-transit peers. This helps to prevent hijacked IP space from propagating around the Internet. We apply inbound filters to our peers. These filters are built from IRR objects and are applied automatically to our peering sessions.
Action 3: Facilitate global operational communication and coordination
When incidents do occur, it is important that network operators can quickly reach engineers in other organisations. To do this, up-to-date contact information must be accessible in the common tools we all use. We maintain contact info in PeeringDB as well as the relevant RIR databases. We also have a looking glass tool which allows anyone to peak into our network and see the path our routers are taking to a particular destination.
Action 4: Facilitate validation of routing information on a global scale
RPKI aims at security routing information by validating that the ASN originating a prefix is the legitimate owner of the prefix. As more network operators impmement RPKI, it becomes harder to hijack prefixes which reduces the attack vector. We have ROAs for all our public IPv4 and IPv6 space and we drop any prefix with an invalid validation state.