The United States Government Can Take Lead in RPKI Deployment
According to MANRS Observatory data, among networks run by the US Federal Government, only 0.5% of prefixes could be validated using RPKI in December 2022. Most prefixes from US Federal…
Tracking time delays in the RPKI-based Route Origin Validation supply chain
Study shows how long it takes for a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) to propagate, and how quickly it affects Internet routing and reachability?…
Unpacking the First Route Leak Prevented by ASPA
On 25 January, a fascinating email arrived in my inbox via the Secure Inter-Domain Routing Operations (SIDROPS) mailing list with the subject line “first route leak…
The Benefits of RPKI Signed Checklists
An RSC is a new type of RPKI-signed object that permits a resource holder to sign arbitrary files or documents with a set of Internet resources.
Will 2023 be the Year Half of the Internet is RPKI-Enabled?
While the Internet may not be growing as quickly as it once was, the threat to the whole routing fabric is.
MANRS and the US FCC Notice of Intent on Routing Security
Andrew Gallo is a MANRS Steering Committee Co-chair and Principal IT Architect and Network Engineer at The George Washington University. Earlier this year, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of the…
What You Need to Know About ARIN’s Test of RPKI Infrastructure
On Friday, 5 August 2022, ARIN announced a forthcoming RPKI infrastructure test. At some point in September, both RSYNC and RRDP access to the RPKI repository will be unavailable…
One Does Not Simply “Deploy RPKI”
<Massimo Candela is a 2022 MANRS Ambassador and will speak on the topic below during RPKI Week today on Tuesday, 5 July, starting at 12:00 UTC. Register…
Routing Security a Work in Progress in Australia, New Zealand
Terry Sweetser Status of RPKI in Australia and New Zealand The world needs a secure and resilient Internet, especially in the face of an ongoing pandemic…